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Abstract
An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent sys-
tems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational
complexity of false-name manipulation in weighted voting games which are an important class
of coalitional voting games. Weighted voting games have received increased interest in the
multiagent community due to their compact representation and ability to model coalitional
formation scenarios. Bachrach and Elkind in their AAMAS 2008 paper examined divide and
conquer false-name manipulation in weighted voting games from the point of view of Shapley-
Shubik index. We analyse the corresponding case of the Banzhaf index and check how much
the Banzhaf index of a player increases or decreases if it splits up into sub-players. A pseudo-
polynomial algorithm to find the optimal split is also provided. Bachrach and Elkind also
mentioned manipulation via merging as an open problem. In the paper, we examine the cases
where a player annexes other players or merges with them to increase their Banzhaf index or
Shapley-Shubik index payoff. We characterize the computational complexity of such manipula-
tions and provide limits to the manipulation. The annexation non-monotonicity paradox is also
discovered in the case of the Banzhaf index. The results give insight into coalition formation
and manipulation.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Weighted voting games (WVGs) are mathematical models which are used to analyze voting bodies
in which the voters have different numbers of votes. In WVGs, each voter is assigned a non-
negative weight and makes a vote in favour of or against a bill. The bill is passed if and only if
the total weight of those voting in favour of the bill is greater than or equal to some fixed quota.
Power indices such as the Banzhaf index measure the ability of a player in a WVG to determine
the outcome of the vote.
WVGs have received increased interest in the artificial intelligence and agents community due
to their ability to model various coalition formation scenarios [15, 16]. Such games have also
been examined from the point of view of susceptibility to manipulations [5, 39]. WVGs and
coalitional voting games are also encountered in threshold logic, reliability theory, neuroscience
and logical computing devices [33, 34, 31]. WVGs have been applied in various political and
economic organizations [23, 22, 1]. Voting power is used in joint stock companies where each
shareholder gets votes in proportion to the ownership of a stock [19].
Elkind et al. [15] note that since WVGs have only two possible outcomes, they do not fall prey to
manipulation of the type characterized by Gibbard-Satterthwaite [20]. However, there are various
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ways WVGs can be manipulated and controlled. Splitting of a player into sub-players can be seen
as a false-name manipulation by an agent where it splits itself into multiple agents so that the sum
of the utilities of the split-up players is more than the utility of the original player [5]. We examine
situations when a player splitting up into smaller players may be advantageous or disadvantageous
in the context of WVGs and Banzhaf indices. This gives a better idea of how to devise WVGs in
which manipulation can be deterred. This may be done by keeping larger or non-integer weights.
Moreover, we also examine the case of players merging to maximize their payoff in a WVG. This
was mentioned as an unexplored question in [5].
1.2 Outline
In Section 2, some basic definitions concerning simple games, weighted voting games and power
indices are provided. Section 3 provides a brief literature survey. In Section 4, the case of players
splitting up into sub-players in a WVG to increase their Banzhaf index is analysed. We examine
the extent to which the Banzhaf index of a player can increase or decrease if it splits up into
sub-players. From a computational perspective, it is #P-hard [30] to compute the payoff in the
WVG. A prospective manipulator could still be interested in enabling a beneficial split even if
he cannot compute the actual payoff. Moreover, this model is reasonable because the centre is
assumed to have much more computational resources than the players. In Section 5, we prove that
it is NP-hard even to decide whether a split is beneficial or not. In the end a pseudo-polynomial
algorithm is proposed which returns ‘no’ if no beneficial split is available and returns the optimal
split otherwise. Section 6 is about the case of players annexing others or voluntarily merging into
blocs to maximize their payoffs. It is shown that it is NP-hard to decide a beneficial merge for
both the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index and to decide a beneficial annexation for
the case of the Banzhaf index. Limits to manipulation are also provided. The final section presents
conclusions and ideas for future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we give definitions and notations of key terms. The set of voters is N = {1, ..., n}.
Definitions 2.1. A simple voting game is a pair (N, v) where the valuation function v : 2N →
{0, 1} has the properties that v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1 and v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . A coalition
S ⊆ N is winning if v(S) = 1 and losing if v(S) = 0. A simple voting game can alternatively be
defined as (N,W ) where W is the set of winning coalitions.
Definitions 2.2. The simple voting game (N,W ) where
W = {X ⊆ N,
∑
x∈X wx ≥ q} is called a weighted voting game (WVG). A WVG is denoted by
[q;w1, w2, ..., wn] where wi ≥ 0 is the voting weight of player i. By convention, we take wi ≥ wj if
i < j.
Usually, q > 12
∑
1≤i≤nwi so that there are no two mutually exclusive winning coalitions at the
same time. WVGs with this property are termed proper. Proper WVGs are desirable because
more than a majority is necessary to force the decision.
Definitions 2.3. A player i is critical in a winning coalition S when S ∈ W and S \ {i} /∈ W .
For each i ∈ N , we denote the number of coalitions in which i is critical in game v by ηi(v). The
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Banzhaf index of player i in WVG v is βi =
ηi(v)P
i∈Nηi(v)
. The probabilistic Banzhaf index, β
′
i of
player i in game v is equal to ηi(v)/2
n−1.
Definitions 2.4. The Shapley-Shubik value is the function κ that assigns to any simple game
(N, v) and any voter i a value κi(v) where κi =
∑
X⊆N (|X| − 1)!(n − |X|)!(v(X) − v(X − {i})).
The Shapley-Shubik index of i is the function φ defined by φi =
κi
n!
3 Related work
Weighted voting games date back at least to John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern who
developed their theory in their monumental book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior [36].
WVGs and voting power indices have been analyzed extensively in the game theory literature for
instance in [14, 32]. They have been applied to various economic and political bodies such as the EU
Council of Ministers and the IMF [23]. Power indices such as the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-
Shubik index originated in such a setting in order to gauge the decision making ability of players.
These indices have now been utilized in different domains such as networks [7]. Simple games and
weighted voting games are known by different names in other literatures and communities. There
is considerable work on similar models in threshold logic [26].
As useful and succinct models for coalitional voting games, WVGs have been utilized in multiagent
systems. Voting power indices in WVGs have received increased interest in multiagent systems
[17, 6, 4, 2]. The dimension of a multiple weighted voting game is the minimum number of
weighted voting games required to represent it. The dimension of multiple weighted voting games
has been examined in [15] and [13]. Moreover, the complexity of questions related to important
cooperative game solutions in WVGs such as the core and nucleolus are considered in [16]. WVGs
have also been examined from the point of view of control and manipulation. Zuckerman et al.
[39] analyse how the centre might control WVGs by changing the quota even if the weights are
fixed. The most relevant work is by Elkind et al. [5] where they examine false-name manipulation
in WVGs from the point of view of the Shapley-Shubik index. In fact, our paper answers problems
posed by Elkind et al. Players forming blocs have been considered by political scientists and
economists previously [18]. However, in this paper, a complexity theoretic analysis of bloc forming
manipulation has also been undertaken for WVGs. False name manipulations in open anonymous
environments have been examined in different domains such as coalitional games [38, 28, 27] and
auctions [37, 21]. The characteristic function by itself does not give enough information to analyze
false-name manipulations especially if a player splits into sub-players. Therefore Yokoo et al. [38]
introduced the model where each player has a subset of skills and the characteristic function
assigns values to the subset of skills. We notice that false-name manipulations in WVGs can still
be analyzed directly without considering more fine-grained representations.
4 Splitting
4.1 Background
In the real world, WVGs may be dynamic. Players might have an incentive to split up into
smaller players or merge into voting blocks. Payoffs of players in a coalitional games setting
can be based on fairness, i.e., power indices, or they can be based on the notion of stability,
which includes many cooperative game theoretic concepts such as core, nucleolus etc. We examine
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the situation when the Banzhaf indices of agents can be used as payoffs in a cooperative game
theoretic situation. Falsenthal and Machover [24] refer to this notion of voting power as P-power
since the motivation of agents is prize-seeking as opposed to influence-seeking. However Banzhaf
indices have been considered as possible payments in cooperative settings [35, 5] and they satisfy
desirable axioms [14]. Splitting of a player can be seen as a false-name manipulation by an agent,
in which it splits itself into multiple agents so that the sum of the utilities of the split-up players
is more than the utility of the original player [5].
Splitting is not always beneficial. We give examples where, if we use Banzhaf indices as payoffs of
players in a WVG, splitting can be advantageous, neutral or disadvantageous.
Example 4.1. Splitting can be advantageous, neutral or disadvantageous:
• Disadvantageous splitting. In the WVG [5; 2, 2, 2] each player has a Banzhaf index of 1/3.
If the last player splits up into two players, the new game is [5; 2, 2, 1, 1]. In that case, the
split-up players have a Banzhaf index of 1/8 each.
• Neutral splitting. In the WVG [4; 2, 2, 2] each player has a Banzhaf index of 1/3. If the last
player splits up into two players, the new game is [4; 2, 2, 1, 1]. In that case, the split-up
players have a Banzhaf index of 1/6 each.
• Advantageous splitting. In the WVG [6; 2, 2, 2] each player has a Banzhaf index of 1/3. If the
last player splits up into two players, the new game is [6; 2, 2, 1, 1]. In that case, the split-up
players have a Banzhaf index of 1/4 each.
We analyse the splitting of players in the unanimity WVG.
Proposition 4.2. In a unanimity WVG with q = w(N), if Banzhaf indices are used as payoffs of
agents in a WVG, then it is beneficial for an agent to split up into several agents.
Proof. In a WVG with q = w(N), the Banzhaf index of each player is 1/n. Let player i split up
into m + 1 players. In that case there is a total of n +m players and the Banzhaf index of each
player is 1/(n +m). In that case the total Banzhaf index of the split up players is m+1n+m , and for
n > 1, m+1n+m >
1
n . An exactly similar analysis holds for Shapley-Shubik index.
However there is the same motivation for all agents to split up into smaller players which would
return the agents to parity.
4.2 General case
We recall that a player is critical in a winning coalition if the player’s exclusion makes the coalition
losing. We will also say that a player is critical for a losing coalition C if the player’s inclusion
results in the coalition winning.
Proposition 4.3. Let WVG v be [q;w1, . . . , wn]. If v transforms to v
′ by the splitting of player i
into i′ and i′′, then βi′(v′) + βi′′(v′) ≤ 2βi(v). Moreover, this upper bound is asymptotically tight.
Proof. We assume that a player i splits up into i′ and i′′ and that wi′ ≤ wi′′ . We consider a losing
coalition C for which i is critical in v. Then w(C) < q ≤ w(C) +wi = w(C) + wi′ +wi′′ .
• If q − w(C) ≤ wi′ , then i
′ and i′′ are critical for C in v′.
4
• If wi′ < q − w(C) ≤ wi′′ , then i
′ is critical for C ∪ {i′′} and i′′ is critical for C in v′.
• If q − w(C) > wi′′ , then i
′ is critical for C ∪ {i′′} and i′′ is critical for C ∪ {i′} in v′.
Therefore we have ηi′(v
′) + ηi′′(v′) = 2ηi(v) in each case.
Now we consider a player x in v which is other than player i. If x is critical for a coalition C in
v then x is also critical for the corresponding coalition C ′ in v′ where we replace {i} by {i′, i′′}.
Hence ηx(v) ≤ ηx(v
′). Of course x may also be critical for some coalitions in v′ which contain just
one of i′ and i′′, so the above inequality will not in general be an equality. Moreover,
βi′(v
′) + βi′′(v′) =
2ηi(v)
2ηi(v) +
∑
x∈N(v′)\{i′,i′′} ηx(v′)
≤
2ηi(v)
2ηi(v) +
∑
x∈N(v)\{i} ηx(v)
≤
2ηi(v)
ηi(v) +
∑
x∈N(v)\{i} ηx(v)
= 2βi(v)
We can prove that this coefficient of 2 is best possible. We take a WVG [n; 2, 1, . . . , 1] with n+ 1
players. We find that η1 = n+
(n
2
)
and for all other x, ηx = 1 +
(n−1
2
)
. Therefore
β1 =
n+
(n
2
)
n+
(n
2
)
+ n(1 +
(n−1
2
)
)
=
n+ 1
(n− 2)2
∼ 1/n.
In case player 1 splits up into 1′ and 1′′ with weights 1 each, then for all players j, βj = 1n+2 . Thus
for large n, β1′ + β1′′ =
2
n+2 ∼ 2β1.
Moreover, we show that splitting into two players can decrease the Banzhaf index payoff by as
much as a factor of almost
√
pi
2n :
Example 4.4. Disadvantageous splitting. We take aWVG v on n players where v = [3n/2; 2n, 1, . . . , 1].
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that n is even. It is easy to see that player 1 is a dictator.
Now we consider the case where v changes into v′ with player 1 splitting up into 1′ and 1′′ with
weight n each. For player 1′ to be critical for a losing coalition in v′, the coalition much exclude
1′′ and have from n/2 to n − 1 players with weight 1 or it must include 1′′ and have from 0 to
(n/2−1) players with weight 1. So η1′(v
′) = η1′′(v′) =
∑n
i=0
(n−1
i
)
= 2n−1. Moreover, for a smaller
player x with weight 1 to be critical for a coalition in v′, the coalition must include only one of 1′
or 1′′ and (n− 2)/2 of the n− 2 other smaller players. So, ηx(v′) = 2
( n−2
(n−2)/2
)
. By using Stirling’s
formula, we can approximate ηx(v
′) by
√
2
pi(n−2)2
n−1. We see that:
βi′(v
′) = βi′′(v′)
≈
2n−1
2n−1 + 2n−1 + (n− 1)
√
2
pi(n−2)2
n−1
=
1
2 + (n−1)√
n−2
√
2
pi
∼
√
pi
2n
.
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We notice that the bounds on the effect of splitting on the Banzhaf index are quite similar to those
in the Shapley-Shubik case.
5 Complexity of finding a beneficial split
From a computational perspective, it is #P-hard for a manipulator to find the ideal splitting to
maximize his payoff. An easier question is to check whether a beneficial split exists or not. We
define a Banzhaf version of the BENEFICIAL SPLIT problem defined in [5].
Name: BENEFICIAL-BANZHAF-SPLIT
Instance: (v, i) where v is the WVG v = [q;w1, . . . , wn] and player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Question: Is there a way for player i to split his weight wi between sub-players i1, . . . , im so that,
in the new game v′,
∑m
j=1 βij (v
′) > βi(v)?
Proposition 5.1. BENEFICIAL-BANZHAF-SPLIT is NP-hard, and remains NP-hard even if
the player can only split into two players with equal weights.
Proof. We prove this by a reduction from an instance of the classical NP-hard PARTITION prob-
lem to BENEFICIAL-BZ-SPLIT.
Name: PARTITION
Instance: A set of k integer weights A = {a1, . . . , ak}.
Question: Is it possible to partition A, into two subsets P1 ⊆ A, P2 ⊆ A so that P1 ∩P2 = ∅ and
P1 ∪ P2 = A and
∑
ai∈A1 ai =
∑
ai∈A2 ai?
Given an instance of PARTITION {a1, . . . , ak}, we can transform it to a WVG v = [q;w1, . . . , wn]
with n = k + 1 where wi = 8ai for i = 1 to n − 1, wn = 2 and q = 4
∑k
i=1 ai + 2. After that, we
want to see whether it can be beneficial for player n with weight 2 to split into two sub-players n
and n+1 each with weight 1 to form a new WVG v′ = [q;w1, . . . , wn−1, 1, 1]. Note that, since the
weights are integral, it is certainly not beneficial to split up a weight of 2 other than into 1 and 1.
If A is a ‘no’ instance of PARTITION, then we see that no subset of the weights {w1, . . . , wn−1}
can sum to 4
∑
i ai. This implies that player n is a dummy. We see that even if player n splits into
sub-players, the sub-players are also dummies. Therefore (v, n) is a ‘no’ instance of BENEFICIAL-
BZ-SPLIT.
Now let us assume that A is a ‘yes’ instance of PARTITION. In that case, let the number of subsets
of weights {w1, . . . wn−1} summing to 4
∑
i ai be x. Then ηn(v) = x. For i ≤ n − 1, player i can
be critical in winning coalition with weight exactly q or more than q. We note that exactly half of
the x subsets of {w1, . . . wn−1} summing to 4
∑
i ai contain wi. If player i is critical in a coalition
C which is a subset of {w1, . . . wn−1} then i is also critical in C ∪ {wn}. Therefore for i ≤ n − 1,
ηi(v) =
x
2 + 2yi where yi is the number of subsets of {w1, . . . wn−1} in which i is critical. We see
that
βn(v) =
x
x+ kx2 + 2y
where
∑
i≤n−1
yi = y.
However, in the new game v′, ηn(v′) = ηn+1(v′) = x and for i ≤ n− 1, ηi(v′) = x2 +4yi, since there
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are now 4 coalitions, C,C ∪ {wn}, C ∪ {wn+1}, C ∪ {wn, wn+1}, corresponding to each C. So
βn(v
′) + βn+1(v′) =
2x
2x+ kx/2 + 4y
> βn(v),
since x > 0. Thus, a ‘yes’ instance of PARTITION implies a ‘yes’ instance of BENEFICIAL-BZ-
SPLIT.
In terms of minimizing chances of manipulation, we see that computational complexity acts as
a barrier. This idea of using computational complexity to model bounded rationality is well
explained by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [29]. In the context of complexity of voting, it was a
series of groundbreaking papers by Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey, and Trick [8, 9, 10, 11] that showed
how important computationally complexity consideration is in terms of ease of computing winners
and difficulty of manipulation.
5.1 Pseudopolynomial algorithm
It is well known that, although computing Banzhaf indices of players in a WVG is NP-hard, there
are polynomial time algorithms using dynamic programming [25] or generating functions [12] to
compute Banzhaf indices if the weights of players are polynomial in n. Let this pseudo-polynomial
algorithm be BanzhafIndex(v, i) which takes a WVG v and an index i as input and returns βi(v),
the Banzhaf index of player i in v. We use a similar argument as in [5] to show that a polynomial
algorithm exists to find a beneficial split if the weights of players are polynomial in n and the
player i in question can split into up to a constant k number of sub-players with integer weights.
Algorithm 1 takes as input a WVG v and player i which can split into a maximum of k number
of players. The algorithm returns ‘no’ if no beneficial split exists and returns the optimal split
otherwise. Whenever player i in WVG v splits according to a split s, we denote the new game by
vi,s.
We see that the total number of splits for player i is equal to q(wi, k) where q(n, k) is the partition
function which gives the number of partitions of n with k or fewer addends. It is clear that for a
constant k, the number of splits of player i is less than (wi)
k which is a polynomial in n. Since
the computational complexity for each split is also a polynomial in n, therefore Algorithm 1 is
polynomial in n if the weights are polynomial in n.
6 Merging and annexation
For the case of players merging to gain advantage, we examine two cases. One is annexation where
one voter takes the voting weight of other voters. The annexation is advantageous if the payoff of
the new merged coalition in the new game is greater than the payoff of the annexer in the original
game. The other case is voluntary merging where voters merge to become a bloc for which their
new payoff is more than the sum of their individual payoffs. For every game (N, v), the result of
the merging of players in coalition S is another game ((N \ S) ∪ {&S}, v&S).
We define the problem of checking a beneficial voluntary merge or annexation:
Name: BENEFICIAL-BZ-MERGE
Instance: (v, S) where v is the WVG v = [q;w1, . . . , wn] and S ⊂ N .
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Algorithm 1 BeneficialSplitInWVG
Input: (v, i) where v = [q;w1, . . . , wn] and i is the player which wants to split into a maximum of
k sub-players.
Output: Returns NO if there is no beneficial split. Otherwise returns the optimal split
(wi1 , . . . , wik′ ) where k
′ ≤ k, and
∑k′
j=1wij = wi.
1: BeneficialSplitExists = false
2: BestSplit = ∅
3: BestSplitValue = −∞
4: βi = BanzhafIndex(v, i)
5: for j = 2 to k do
6: for Each possible split s where wi = wi1 + . . .+ wij do
7: SplitValue =
∑j
a=1 BanzhafIndex(vi,s, ia)
8: if SplitValue > βi then
9: BeneficialSplitExists = true
10: if SplitValue > BestSplitValue then
11: BestSplit = s
12: BestSplitValue = SplitValue
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: if BeneficialSplitExists = false then
18: return false
19: else
20: return BestSplit
21: end if
Question: Suppose coalition S merges to form a new game ((N \S)∪{&S}, v&S). Is β&S(v&S) >∑
i∈S βi(v)?
Name: BENEFICIAL-BZ-ANNEXATION
Instance: (v, S, i) where v is the WVG v = [q;w1, . . . , wn], i is the ith player in v and S ⊂ (N\{i}).
Question: If i annexes coalition S to form a new game ((N \ (S ∪{i}))∪{&(S ∪{i})}, v&(S∪{i})),
is βi(v&(S∪{i})) > βi(v)?
If Shapley-Shubik indices are used as payoffs in place of Banzhaf indices, then the corresponding
problems are defined with BZ replaced by SS so that BENEFICIAL-SS-MERGE corresponds to
BENEFICIAL-BZ-MERGE. Felsenthal and Machover [18] prove that if a player annexes other
players, then it cannot be the case that the annexation is disadvantageous if the Shapley-Shubik
indices are used as payoffs. We provide a clear and simple proof of this theorem. Let player i be
critical for a coalition S in WVG v. Then the contribution to φi(v) from this is
(|S|−1)!(n−|S|)!
n! .
We consider a game v&{i,j} where i annexes j. For every S for which i is critical in v, the
contribution to φ&{i,j}(v&{i,j}) is either
(|S|−2)!(n−|S|)!
(n−1)! or
(|S|−1)!(n−|S|−1)!
(n−1)! . For either case we see
that φ&{i,j}(v&{i,j}) > φi(v). However Felsenthal and Machover [18] show that, for the case of the
Banzhaf index, annexation could be disadvantageous. They provide a 13-player WVG for which
annexation is disadvantageous, which is the simplest example they could find. We provide an
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8-player WVG where annexation is disadvantageous:
Example 6.1. In WVG [13; 7, 6, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1], player 1 has Banzhaf index 0.48507. If player
1 annexes one of the small players, the new game is [13; 8, 6, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1] and the Banzhaf index
becomes 0.47826.
For the case where the merging is voluntary instead of an annexation, for both the Banzhaf index
and Shapley-Shubik index, merging can be advantageous or disadvantageous. As in the case of
splitting, we expect it to be hard to find a beneficial merge:
Proposition 6.2. BENEFICIAL-BZ-MERGE is NP-hard.
Proof. Given an instance of PARTITION {a1, . . . , ak}, we can transform it to a WVG v =
[q;w1, . . . , wn] where n = k + 3, wi = 8ai for i = 1 to n − 3, wn−2 = wn−1 = wn = 1, and
q = 4
∑k
i=1 ai + 2.
If A is a ‘no’ instance of PARTITION, then we see that a subset of weights {w1, . . . wn−3} cannot
sum to 4
∑
i ai. This implies that players (n−2), (n−1) and n are dummies. Even if players n and
(n− 1) merge together, the new player &{n− 1, n} remains a dummy in the new game v&{n−1,n}.
Now let us assume that A is a ‘yes’ instance of PARTITION. In that case, let the number of
subsets of weights {w1, . . . wn−3} summing to 4
∑
i ai be x. For i ≤ n−3, player i can be critical in
winning coalitions with weight q or q+1 or more than q+1. The number of coalitions for the first
two cases are 3x/2 and x/2, respectively, corresponding to the participation of either 2 or 3 of the
unit players. The third case corresponds to coalitions in which the three unit players are dummies.
Therefore for i ≤ n−3, ηi =
4x
2 +8yi where yi is the number of subsets of {w1, . . . , wn−3} in which
i is critical. Moreover, ηn−2(v) = ηn−1(v) = ηn(v) = 2x, since each unit player is critical only
when exactly one other of these is in the coalition. Then
βn(v) =
2x
6x+ 4kx2 + 8y
, where
∑
i≤n−3
yi = y.
In the new game v&{n−1,n}, η&{n−1,n}(v&{n−1,n}) is 2x but ηn−2(v&{n−1,n}) is 0. For i ≤ n − 3,
ηi(v&{n−1,n}) is 2x2 + 4yi. We see that
β&{n−1,n}(v&{n−1,n}) =
2x
2x+ 2kx/2 + 4y
.
Therefore,
β&{n−1,n}(v&{n−1,n}) > βn(v) + βn−1(v),
which means that n and (n− 1) had a beneficial merge. It has been shown that a ‘yes’ instance of
PARTITION implies a ‘yes’ instance of BENEFICIAL-BZ-MERGE.
Proposition 6.3. BENEFICIAL-BZ-ANNEXATION is NP-hard.
Proof. Given an instance of PARTITION, {a1, . . . , ak}, we can transform it to a WVG v =
[q;w1, . . . , wn] where n = k+2, wi = 8ai for i = 1 to n−2, wn−1 = 1, wn = 1 and q = 4
∑k
i=1 ai+2.
Just as in Proposition 6.2, we see that a ‘no’ instance of partition implies that wn−1 and wn are
dummies even if n annexes (n − 1). However, a ‘yes’ instance of partition implies that player n
benefits by annexing player (n− 1).
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Proposition 6.4. BENEFICIAL-SS-MERGE is NP-hard
Proof. Given an instance of PARTITION {a1, . . . , ak}, we can transform it to a WVG v =
[q;w1, . . . , wn] where n = k + 3, wi = 8ai for i = 1 to n − 2, wn−2 = wn−1 = wn = 1, and
q = 4
∑k
i=1 ai + 2.
If A is a ‘no’ instance of PARTITION, then we see that a subset of weights {w1, . . . wn−3} cannot
sum to 4
∑
i ai. This implies that players (n−2), (n−1) and n are dummies. Even if player n and
(n− 1) merge together, the new player &{n− 1, n} remains a dummy in the new game v&{n−1,n}.
Now let us assume that A is a ‘yes’ instance of PARTITION. For each partition (P1, P2) where
|P1| = p1 and |P2| = p1, we check the number of permutations corresponding to (P1, P2). In the
original game v, the contribution to the Shapley-Shubik payoff for either player n or (n − 1) by
the permutations corresponding to (P1, P2) is
2(p1 + 1)!(p2 + 1)!
n!
=
p1!p2!
n!
2(p1 + 1)(p2 + 1).
If players n and n − 1 merge into bloc &{n − 1, n}, then the contribution to the Shapley-Shubik
payoff to bloc &{n− 1, n} by the permutations corresponding to (P1, P2) is
p1!(p2 + 1)! + (p1 + 1)!p2!
(n− 1)!
=
p1!p2!
n!
(n(p1 + 1 + p2 + 1)).
For the merge to be beneficial, it is required that the sum of the Shapley-Shubik indices of (n− 1)
and n in the original game v is less than the Shapley-Shubik index of &{n − 1, n} in the game
v&{n−1,n}, i.e., 4(p1 + 1)(p2 + 1) < n(p1 + 1 + p2 + 1). Since (p1 + 1) + (p2 + 1) = n− 1, we have
4(p1 + 1)(p2 + 1) ≤ 4
(
n− 1
2
)2
< n(n− 1) = n(p1 + 1 + p2 + 1),
and so φn−1(v) + φn(v) < φ&{n−1,n}(v&{n−1,n}).
We examine the limits of advantage or disadvantage for the case of the annexation of another
player to increase the Banzhaf index.
Proposition 6.5.
βi(v)+βj (v)
2 ≤ βi(v&({i,j})) ≤ 1.
Proof. Let v be WVG [q;w1, . . . , wn]. Suppose i annexes or merges with player j and v
′ is v&({i,j}).
Then the new game is ((N \ {j})∪ {&({i, j})}, v′). From the proof of Proposition 4.3, we see that
η&({i,j})(v′) equals 12(βi(v) + βj(v)).
Now consider a player x which is other than player i or player j. Let S be coalition such that
S ⊆ N \ {i, j, x}. If x is critical for S in v then x is critical for S in v′. If x is critical for S ∪ {i, j}
in v then x is critical for S ∪&({i, j}) in v′. However, x may also be critical for S ∪ {i} or S ∪ {j}
in v. So ηx(v) ≥ ηx(v
′). We see that:
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β&({i,j})(v′) =
η&({i,j})(v′)
η&({i,j})(v′) +
∑
x∈(N\{i,j}) ηx(v′)
=
1
2(ηi(v) + ηj(v))
1
2 (ηi(v) + ηj(v)) +
∑
x∈(N\{i,j}) ηx(v′)
≥
1
2 (ηi(v) + ηj(v))
ηi(v) + ηj(v) +
∑
x∈(N\{i,j}) ηx(v)
=
1
2
(βi(v) + βj(v)).
The upper bound is tight and easy to observe. If player i is a dummy and j is a dictator then
βi(v) = 0 whereas βi(v
′) = 1. The upper bound can also be achieved by two big enough players
joining forces.
We have seen that annexation can be disadvantageous in the case of the Banzhaf index. One would
at least expect that the Banzhaf index payoff after annexing another player to be monotone in
the power of the annexed player. Surprisingly, this is not the case. Suppose wi ≥ wj ≥ wk in a
WVG v. We provide an example where βi,k > βi,j . We call this the annexation non-monotonicity
paradox :
Example 6.6. In the WVG [9; 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1] we see that player 2 has more weight than player 3.
However if player 1 annexes player 2 to form game [9; 6, 2, 1, 1, 1], its Banzhaf index is 0.4, whereas
if player 1 annexes player 3 to form game [9; 5, 3, 1, 1, 1], its Banzhaf index is 0.411765.
Proposition 6.7. For any coalition, S ⊂ N \ {i}, φi(v) ≤ φi(v&({i}∪S)) ≤ 1.
Proof. The lower bound follows from the result by Felsenthal and Machover [18] that annexation
cannot decrease the Shapley-Shubik index of a player. Moreover, the upper bound is tight and
easily attainable if {i} ∪ S is big enough.
Proposition 6.8. For the unanimity game and for both the Shapley-Shubik index and Banzhaf
index:
1. it is disadvantageous for a coalition to merge;
2. it is advantageous for a player to annex.
Proof. We check each case separately:
1. This is expected considering Proposition 4.2. If k players merge, then the payoff of the new
coalition is 1/(n − k + 1). It is easy to see that 1/(n − k + 1) < k/n.
2. For a unanimity WVG with n players, the payoff of each player is 1/n. If a player annexes
k − 1 other players, its payoff is 1/(n − k + 1) which is more than 1/n.
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Table 1: Complexity of False Name Manipulations in WVGs
Banzhaf index Shapley-Shubik Index
SPLITTING NP-hard NP-hard [5]
MERGING NP-hard NP-hard
ANNEXATION NP-hard advantageous [18]
SPLITTING in unanimity game advantageous advantageous [5]
MERGING in unanimity game disadvantageous disadvantageous
ANNEXATION in unanimity game advantageous advantageous
In a WVG, if player i annexes a dummy, then there is no difference to the Banzhaf index payoff
of each player. This is because the Banzhaf value of each player reduces to half of the original
Banzhaf value. Moreover, it follows from Proposition 6.5 that if a player annexes a player bigger
than itself, its Banzhaf index can only increase. Thus annexation could only be disadvantageous,
if a player annexes a smaller player. Although, deciding a beneficial merge or annexation is
computationally difficult, it may often be easier in practice. We propose a simple heuristic to get
beneficial annexations or at least to avoid disadvantageous annexations. It appears to be a better
strategy to annex fewer players with some total weight than more players with the same total
weight. This is because, while annexing, the annexer does not want to increase the payoff of other
players significantly.
7 Conclusions
Weighted voting games are important game models in multiagent systems. We have investigated
the impact on the Banzhaf power distribution due to a player splitting into smaller players in
a weighted voting game. We have also considered the case of manipulation via annexation and
voluntary merging when the payoff is according to the Banzhaf index or the Shapley-Shubik index.
Both the complexity of manipulation and the limits of manipulation are examined. The complex-
ity results are summarised in Table 1. The Shapley-Shubik index appears to be a more desirable
solution because annexation does not decrease the payoff of a player. It is seen that manipulation
may be discouraged by keeping weights which are large or non-integers. The finer, more detailed,
analysis for players splitting into more than two players or merging into bigger blocs is still unex-
plored. Although, it is NP-hard to evaluate different false-name manipulations, it may be the case
that certain instances of WVGs are more susceptible to manipulation [3]. A careful investigation
of heuristics for false-name manipulation is also a promising area of research. There is scope to
analyse such false-name manipulations with respect to other cooperative game-theoretic solutions.
A particularly suitable solution to consider could be the nucleolus which not only always exists but
is also unique. Further examination into various aspects of manipulation in weighted voting games
promises to give better insight into designing fairer and manipulation-resistant systems. Another
interesting question is to what extent can the results be applied to more general cooperative games.
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